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Retooling the 2010 Election
as a Weapon for Democracy
Maimire
Mennasemay [PhD] January 21, 2010
What to do
with the 2010 election?
Whatever one’s
position on the 2010 general election, a number of things are certain. First,
the election will take place. Second, the democratic forces are fragmented and
at loggerheads with each other, but almost all of them—those who signed the Code
of Conduct and those who did not—are participating
in the election. Third, the history of
the TPLF/EPRDF makes it certain that it will use fraud, intimidation, arrest,
imprisonment, and violence to win the elections.
A cursory
examination of the current debate on the 2010 election shows a wide and
contradictory range of views. Not surprisingly, those who support the TPLF/EPRDF
assert that the 2010 election is as democratic as they come and accuse its
detractors of all the political ills one could imagine. Those who support the
parties that signed the Code of Conduct seem to have divergent but overlapping
answers. Some seem to imply that democracy will emerge only if they work within
the system. Others seem to believe, rather faintly, that the democratic victory
of 2005, crushed by the TPLF/EPRDF, could be re-enacted. Still others argue that
even if it is certain that the TPLF/EPDRF will win the election, the electoral
exercise will have pedagogical benefits for the democratic struggle against the
current authoritarian regime. Finally, those who are opposed to the signing of
the Code of Conduct consider the 2010 election a sham. For the latter,
participating in the election will do nothing else but misleadingly legitimize
the TPLF/EPDRF dictatorship as a democratic regime.
Though these
answers express contradictory sentiments and values, there is a grain of truth
in most of them. Since the democratic forces seem unable to coalesce into a
single democratic movement for the purpose of the election, the challenge for
them now is to allow their divergent approaches to converge, without formal
cooperation, so that a tapestry of political actions emerges that
point in the same direction; to wit, the goal of de-legitimizing
the current authoritarian ethnic state. Such an approach will not require
the various democratic parties to change their specific political commitments.
However, it requires that they look at their specific programs from the
perspective of the alternative Ethiopia—democratic, prosperous, and just—that
all Ethiopians yearn for. By eschewing the practice of denigrating each other,
and by committing their intelligence, courage and effort to a relentless
critique of the disastrous policies and actions of the regime, they could open a
new political horizon that could make the victory of the TPLF/EPDRF a defeat in
victory, thus paving the way for its eventual exit. The question then is how to
transform the 2010 election into a weapon for making the forecasted TPLF/EPDRF’s
electoral victory the womb of its own defeat.
“Every tool
is a weapon, if you hold it right”
An idea from
our own culture suggests an approach that could help the pro-democratic parties
to achieve this end. A Gurage /Chaha saying runs: “The cure for the evil eye is
in the evil eye”. This profoundly dialectical Guarge saying draws our attention
to the important fact that we could find the answers to our questions in the
errors we make and have made in the past as well as in the evils we combat. Such
quests for answers that will help us overcome the adversities we confront
require changes in the way we see and use the opportunities at hand. In other
words, as Angela Marie Difranco puts it,
“for every lie I unlearn / I
learn something new / I sing sometimes for the war that I fight /
'cause every tool is a
weapon - if you hold it right.”
First,
elections are political tools, and like any tool, every election could become a
tool for democracy if we “hold it right”, which means that if we hold the 2010
election right, it could become a powerful weapon for effectively
de-legitimating the TPLF/EPDRF regime. Second, as the poem suggests, to “learn
something new” is the payoff of “every lie I unlearn”. That is, we could
transform the 2010 election into a weapon for democracy only if we “unlearn” a
certain number of values and habits that have doomed the Ethiopian struggle for
democracy since its beginning. The most destructive lie that the democratic
forces have to unlearn—one that has plagued the Ethiopian democratic struggle
for almost a century—is the lie of “purism”: the belief that only my party, only
my leader, or only I have the only true answer to the question of how democracy
could be achieved in Ethiopia. Since the 1960s, such purism has cost Ethiopians
untold opportunities, efforts and lives. Many political organizations and
individuals—despite the fact that they were sincerely committed to democracy in
Ethiopia—resorted to destructive confrontations, character assassinations,
self-defeating divisions, and even violence rather than pursue the goal of
democracy in their own way without ostracizing those who have a different
approach to the same goal. Purism is still the political beast that is wrecking
havoc within the Ethiopian democratic family. Purism also gives an excellent
opportunity to the TPLF/EPRDF regime to infiltrate and sow discord among the
democratic forces. Laying purism to rest will undoubtedly facilitate the
retooling of the 2010 election into a weapon for democracy; it will increase the
likelihood of the eviction of the current authoritarian regime and make brighter
the prospects of democracy in Ethiopia.
Ethiopia was
not build in a day, nor through a single method. From the Kingdom of Axum to
that of Lalibela, from Ahmad Gragn to the Zemene Mesafint, from Twedros to the
present, Ethiopia was built through diverse and contradictory means, drawing on
the labours, talents, courage and cultures of the Tigreans, Amharas, Oromos,
Somalis, the peoples of the South, East and West, Moslems and Christians,
peasants, pastoralists and workers. The complexity of Ethiopian history suggests
that there will always be differences on how to build democracy and that no
single perspective on democracy could ever adequately mobilize all the Ethiopian
social forces. However, all the diverse perspectives could contribute to it.
Like the many streams that flow into the Abay to form the formidable and
life-giving Blue Nile, the various democratic approaches, if allowed to pursue
their path, could eventually conjoin and form a powerful democratic current as
irresistible as the Abay river when it receives the full complements of its
tributaries. In other words, to render the Ethiopian democratic forces
irresistible, it is imperative to recognize the right to exist and act of
organizations such as MEDREK, AEUP, EDP, GINBOT 7, and other members of the
Ethiopian opposition, provided that they pursue the goal of a democratic
alternative to the present ethnicized and exploitative regime. As long as
political organizations espouse this goal, they should be able to follow their
own path without being crucified for entertaining a different perspective.
Signing or not signing the Code of Conduct, working within or outside the
country, participating or not participating in the election, being a former
member or supporter of the TPLF/EPDRF, should not be used to discredit and
destroy members of the Ethiopian democratic family. If this kind of political
tolerance were to become the code of conduct among members of the Ethiopian
democratic family, the possibility of making the 2010 election an effective
weapon for subverting the current authoritarian ethnic regime and for laying the
foundations for a democratic regime in Ethiopia will be enhanced. The question
then is: What issues could contribute to retooling the 2010 election into a
weapon for democracy?
The Code of
Conduct as a Code of Exclusion
Each
pro-democratic party has probably ideas on how to convert the 2001 election into
an arsenal for democracy. Nevertheless, one could elicit some crucial answers to
the above question by applying the spirit of the Gurage saying and the idea that
“every tool is a
weapon if you hold it right”. To do so, one could start with the Code of Conduct
(COC) that the EPRDF and three
opposition parties—the Ethiopian Democratic Party, All Ethiopia Unity
Organization, and the Coalition for Unity and Democracy Party—signed recently
but that organizations such as the UDJ and MEDREK have rejected.
The COC is made up of
innocuous sounding but deeply insidious statements governing the conduct of
political parties during the election. One should not consider the COC as a
document that floats above the existing Ethiopian conditions. Its very existence
is proof that the present Ethiopian conditions are not democratic, for such a
document would not have been necessary if there were democracy in Ethiopia. The
very existence of the document expresses the need for the TPLF/EPRDF to mask its
oppressive nature and thus demands that the context that called for the
document’s elaboration be injected into the electoral process. Using the COC as
a political boomerang that comes back to its originating context and knocks it
open to expose what it tries to hide— the anti-democratic and exploitative
nature of the TPLF/EPDRF regime—is an action that those who signed and did not
sign the COC, and those who participate and do not participate in the election,
could take. Though each
pro-democracy organization could choose to emphasize the issues that it
considers important, there are a number of crucial elements that are part of the
context of the COC, and that the COC tries to occlude, that need to be exposed.
In reality, the COC functions as a Code of Exclusion of issues that are crucial
for democracy in Ethiopia. Injecting these issues into the 2010 election could
transform it into a transgressive event that effectively subverts the legitimacy
and political power of the TPLF/EPDRF.
Let me then
identify at least five of these issues.
First, the COC masks a lie that
needs to be exposed. History shows that for democracy the route we follow is
infinitely more important than the roots we claim.
It is thus universally recognized that democratic sovereignty is founded
on the separation of powers and not on the separation of ethnies. And yet, this
universal principle is scotomized in the 1994 Constitution and is replaced by
the lie that democratic sovereignty is based on the separation of ethnies. This
lie allows the regime to claim democratic legitimacy while in practice Meles
(and the TPLF politburo) control the executive, the legislature and the
judiciary. It is to cover up this lack of the separation of powers that the COC
presupposes as a given the existence of the separation of powers (article 18).
Since there cannot be democracy without separation of powers, all transgressions
of this principle such as the subordination of parliament and the subjection of
the judiciary to the interests and whims of the TPLF/EPRDF ruling clique, and
other practices that flout the democratic principle of the separation of powers,
need to be brought to the fore. These are crucial issues for all Ethiopians
irrespective of their ethnic origin and faith.
Second, the TPLF/EPDRF regime
claims that Ethiopia’s GDP real growth rate is above 11% . It may well be true.
And yet, according to the World Food Programme, hunger threatens currently more
than six million Ethiopians. In other words, in light of the government’s claim
of high GDP growth rate, it follows that the hunger and the malnutrition that
currently afflicts Ethiopians cannot but be man-made; it cannot be the result of
the absence of economic growth. The main reason for the poverty-ridden living
conditions of the vast majority of Ethiopians is the obscene concentration of
wealth in the hands of the TPLF/EPRDF elites. Banking, import-export,
manufacturing, mining, construction, transport and communication, publishing and
entertainment industries are all concentrated in the hands of these elites.
Possessed by an insatiable greed, these elites are investing heavily in
cash-crop production and are leasing away millions of hectares of fertile land
to foreign countries and companies for the purpose of exporting food. In the
meantime, millions of Ethiopians are reduced to the humiliating life of being
recipients of international food charity. According to the Save the Children
report (September 22, 2009), “Three million children in Ethiopia urgently need
food amid [the] worst crisis in decades.” In the mean time, the ruling elites
enjoy living conditions that would make many a rich American green with envy.
The COC masks three fundamental issues related to this situation. First, it
hides the fact that the regime has instrumentalized hunger for buying political
support from peasants by denying food aid to those who do not submit to its
political will. Second, it masks the present economic injustice that calls
urgently for the liberation of the economy form the iron-grip of the TPLF/EPRDF
elites. Third, it tries to hide the glaring absence of social justice that
allows the existence of wide-spread grinding poverty side-by-side with the
opulent life-style of the ruling elites, an injustice that demands to be exposed
during the election. These are issues about which the great majority of
Ethiopians care, irrespective of their ethnic identity.
Third, the pro-democracy
parties cannot pass in silence the havoc and destruction that the Meles regime
has inflicted on the Ethiopians of the Ogaden. The Somalis are massacred and
their habitat destroyed because they reject the TPLF/EPDRF definition of “ethnic
self-determination” as being the tool of the economic aggrandizement of the
TPLF/EPDRF elites. In light of the scorched-earth policy that the regime pursues
in the Ogaden, one cannot but conclude that the COC, in its article 10, tries to
mask the regime’s abhorrent use of the “Ethiopian defense forces” to implement
and defend the interests of the TPLF/EPDRF elites. It is precisely the TPLF
self-serving definition of democratic sovereignty in terms of the separation of
ethnies rather than in terms of the separation of powers that gave the
TPLF/EPDRF regime a free hand to exploit “ethnic self-determination” as a tool
for extracting wealth and use in the process the “Ethiopian defense forces” as
the private army of the ruling elite. Given this context, no Ethiopian, in any
region of Ethiopia, is immune from being subjected one day to the fate of the
Ethiopians of the Ogaden, if the interests of the TPLF/EPDRF require it. This is
an issue then that is of interest to all Ethiopians, whatever region they hail
from.
Fourth, the COC embodies
another lie—that Ethiopia belongs to all Ethiopians. Its mention of “the
Ethiopian citizens’ centuries struggle” (article 13) masks the fact that the
TPLF/EPDRF has blatantly betrayed these “centuries of struggle” by creating a
regime where not only the overwhelming wealth of the country is appropriated by
the TPLF ruling elite, but also a state whose upper echelons of the armed,
police and security forces as well as of the bureaucratic, judiciary and
diplomatic offices are almost entirely in the hands of the ethnic group that the
TPLF claims to represent. Never in the history of Ethiopia has a single ethnie
so thoroughly monopolized the upper ranks of the armed, police and security
forces, the commanding heights of the state bureaucracy, the economy and the
judiciary as under the TPLF/EPDRF regime. This is an issue that concerns all
Ethiopians. In the Ethiopia of TPLF/EPDRF there are two classes of Ethiopian
citizens—the “golden” citizens (to cite Meles’s intentionally divisive epithet)
who have access to political, economic, social powers and the commanding heights
of the state apparatus, and the “others”, who, though constituting the majority,
are recognized as “citizens” only if they submit to the will of the regime.
Ethiopians, including those who Meles abusively reduces to being only his ethnic
kin and kith, ignoring the historical record that Tigreans are the kin and kith
of all Ethiopians, reject this abominable conception of citizenship.
Finally, article 1 of the COC
pays lip-service to the “imperative of the realization of the human and
democratic rights” of Ethiopians. But the fact of the matter is that Ethiopians
are subject to serious human, political and civic rights violations before the
signing of the COC, and are still subject to the same indignities and
oppressions after the signing of the COC. The shining symbol of the persistence
of this repression is the continued incarceration of Judge Burtukan. Her “crime”
was to be the authentic voice of the deep yearning of Ethiopians for democracy.
The injustice inflicted on the thousands of Ethiopians who are harassed and
imprisoned for no other reason than their conviction that Ethiopians have the
right to speak and associate with each other freely cannot be elided over in the
2010 election. What the COC tries to do in its cynical assumption that “human
and democratic rights” are currently respected is to exclude the violation of
these rights as an issue.
There is still Sufficient
Time
Bringing to the fore the above
issues—all occluded by the COC through phrasings that assume that these issues
do not exist and that bringing them up is tantamount to misconduct—will surely
transform the 2010 election into a weapon for democracy that will de-legitimate
and thus undermine the TPLF/EPDRF’s hold on power. But this is possible only if
the members of the Ethiopian democratic family abide by a democratic code of
conduct, implicit or explicit, based on mutual respect and tolerance.
The TPLF/EPDRF penned
Code of Conduct is in reality a Code of Exclusion that tries to put out of
bounds precisely those issues that are of concern to all the members of the
Ethiopian democratic family: to those who signed the COC and those who rejected
it, to those who participate in the election and those who do not, and to all
those who, whatever their particular political approach may be, share the goal
of a democratic Ethiopia. There is still sufficient time left for the democratic
opposition forces to successfully convert the 2010 election into an arsenal of
powerful causes and retool it into a formidable weapon that could transform
TPLF/EPDRF’s predicted victory into a womb that gestates the regime’s defeat,
thus facilitating the birth of
a democratic Ethiopia. This
opportunity should not be wasted.
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