TPLF's Overseas Misadventures

By S. Sharew

June 21, 2006

Meles Zenawi’s foreign ministry has been busy producing a document for a revamped campaign against the Ethiopian Diaspora. In what appears to be implementations of practical measures as advised by the document, cadres and henchmen have already begun recruiting petty informers and the hiring of service from expensive law and lobbying firms. The nation’s embassies in Europe and North America are said to be changing into spy hubs and workshops to fabricate defamatory stories, to concoct misinformation, and to launch all manner of foul political tricks.

TPLF has always practice infiltration, defamation, hostage taking and many other tactics to neutralise its critics, especially Tigrayan critics overseas. So what is new? Nothing much. If there is anything different from past practice, it is perhaps one of scale or degree of blatancy.  The organisation has always maintained an overseas security branch which conducts clandestine operations parallel to, and under cover of, official diplomatic activities. This security branch, like its main section at home, uses rumours and fabricated stories as a tool to discredit or incriminate opponents, to create rift between critics and ethnic communities, and above all to enforce conformity and fear among ethnic Tigrayans. It bribes individuals to become informers, infiltrators and apologists with promises of land, political appointment, investment opportunities and other material advantages. It tries to silence critics by harassing their family members in Ethiopia. It uses routinely overseas branches of Tigrayan associations (women’s, students, etc.)  to disseminate misinformation.

These nefarious practices were less known to the Diaspora Ethiopians simply because most of them were disinterested in politics until the recent election. Their disinterest meant the majority were no threats to the TPLF regime, allowing the latter to manage with minimum security operations. A concentrated small scale operations could have sufficed then to focus on the few active political opponents. Things have changed a great deal since the election campaign began in earnest early in 2005. Infected by events and public enthusiasm at home the Diaspora communities became engaged in politics to the dismay and terror of TPLF cadres. After shock-induced initial paralysis, the network of security branch overseas were said to be frantic with hiding and defending unlicensed/untaxed financial and other business operations, including the task of facilitating the alleged translocation of looted assets. Looming danger receding, it seems they have now breathing space to turn attention to scale-up operations aimed at suppressing or undermining the support of Diaspora communities to the democratic movement at home.

The large scale reorganisation of diplomatic missions, and planned security operations underway are part and parcel of suppressing dissent overseas. Yet little seem to be known to them that large scale security operations especially for an incompetent government are risky. If they are to go ahead with implementing the recommendations of the leaked document  the consequences are likely to blow on their faces. A few of their earlier attempts to intimidate the free expression of views of critics, like those against Tinsae Radio,  have already proven to be ill conceived, expensive  and extremely embarrassing misadventures to Meles Zenawi and his government. For all their  “intelligence” and “political astuteness” they could not grasp the difference in due process between their version of courts and those which operate in democratic and law abiding societies.

Similarly their intentions to misinform western governments on their respective nationals of Ethiopian origin will backfire with legal and political consequences. Gratuitous accusations of ‘genocide’, ‘terrorism’, etc. may be acceptable in the TPLF kangaroo courts, but not so in the west. If such accusations are backed with genuine hard evidence, the Diaspora community will indeed be too happy to see proven terrorist elements exposed and investigated. However, if the rogue regime don’t back up such allegations with hard evidence they should expect to account for them in a court of law. Members of their diplomatic missions may also be made accountable for breach of acceptable diplomatic conduct. ‘Diplomatic immunity’ may mean to them doing as they please in a foreign country. One hopes they along with their collaborators get good advice that it is not so. If they can learn from others at all the story of the murder of WPC Yvonne Fletcher by alleged Gaddafi loyalist in the

 Libyan embassy should serve them as examples.

WPC Fletcher was shot on duty at St James's Square in front of the Libyan embassy on  one fateful spring morning in 1984. She died of her wounds in hospital a little later on. She was one of many officers assigned to monitor a protest of Libyan dissidents against the execution of two students who had criticized Colonel Gaddafi in Tripoli. The embassy staffed by Gaddafi loyalists rather than professional diplomats decided to mount counter-demonstrations. They brought a coach-load of loyalists from north England for the purpose. The staff also engaged themselves with other rogue tactics unbecoming for a diplomatic mission. In the ensuing shouting match shots were fired, allegedly from the embassy, killing WPC Fletcher. 

Following the shooting, the embassy was surrounded by armed police for eleven days. Finally UK cut off diplomatic relations with Libya by deporting her entire mission from the country. The incident contributed further to the isolation of Libya from the international community. The murderer is said to have been hanged by the government upon his return home. After many years of isolation the Libyan government publicly accepted "general responsibility" for the murder of the young policewoman, and in July 1999, they agreed to pay undisclosed sum in compensation to her family.

The TPLF politburo has been hell bent for a wholesale replacement of the country’s ever diminishing professional diplomats with its own loyalists. Unlike professional diplomats loyalists willingly execute immoral and illegal orders from gangsters of the politburo. If the country’s diplomatic work suffers in the process, it is an acceptable cost. For the politburo gangsters there is no high cost Ethiopia cannot pay to protect their personal interests. However, like those thugs of Gaddafi’s loyalists the politburo’s cadre-diplomats are likely to coke-up things for the beleaguered Meles and Co.

Misinforming host governments in the west could be disastrous for TPLF foreign missions. Actions taken on fabricated stories cannot be hushed in the west as in TPLF’s Ethiopia. They can cause expensive and embarrassing course of actions to governments, especially to those under constant threats from terrorists. A good case in point is a recent high profile anti terrorist operations in east London, conducted on the basis of what turned out to be unfounded information. The sources were supposed to be “credible”; but  the operation was disastrous to the police and government in the UK with massive political and personal costs to those involved in the operations. Imagine such misinformation being deliberately provided by TPLF’s security to the UK government. The consequence being so huge, a reasonable person may think the rogue regime would not dare to do so. But TPLF dimwits are capable of the unthinkable. Hatred and vindictiveness have reduced them to suffer from an extreme form of myopia not to see immediate consequences let alone long term implications. For them playing with fire, even when they are greased from tip to toe with highly inflammable substance, is not unthinkable.